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FEAR AND THE REGULATORY MODEL
OF COUNTERTERRORISM
ERIC A. POSNER

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, two
models of government response dominated public discussion.
One model vests the criminal justice system with the authority
to combat terrorism. The FBI and local authorities track down
the terrorists; lawyers prosecute and defend them in courts;
judges and juries try them; prisons await them. If terrorists or
their associates reside abroad, American officials apply for
extradition under existing treaties. Another model vests the
military with the authority to combat terrorism. While the
military pursues terrorists overseas, local officials exercise
emergency powers to detain, search, and interrogate. The
government does not so much punish the terrorists as disrupt
their networks, harass their supporters, and defeat them on the
field of battle. Authorities may use propaganda and
censorship, and may abrogate civil liberties to a limited extent.
A third model of government response to terrorism has
received less attention. This model views terrorist threats as
risks to public health and safety, risks that call for a
bureaucratic response. Unlike the military and law
enforcement models, the third model, the regulatory model,
focuses on the need for long-term reform of regulatory
agencies, such as OSHA, EPA, and FDA.
Regulatory agencies have jurisdiction over countless
activities vulnerable to, or related to, terrorist attacks, and they
have increased their counterterrorist regulatory activity
dramatically in the months since September 11. OSHA has
issued guidelines for the handling of mail that potentially
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contains anthrax spores.! FAA is evaluating new security
standards for airports.2 Bank regulators have cracked down on
financial institutions used by terrorists to launder money.' EPA
and DOE have reappraised the security needs of utilities,
factories, and shipping companies that handle hazardous
materials.4 FDA and CDC have taken a new look at the
supplies of antibiotics and vaccines.5
Much regulatory activity, however, predates September 11.
A recent GAO report describes earlier preparations undertaken
by government agencies, focusing on coordination among
federal agencies and with state and local agencies, and the
development of response teams designed to contain an attack
involving weapons of mass destruction. 6 GAO has paid less
attention to more humdrum regulatory efforts to make
workplaces, buildings, bridges, tunnels, dumps, and other
locations more secure against terrorist attack, although the
security of computer networks and air travel has received
scrutiny.
The regulatory model, then, is not an innovation; it describes
a longstanding element of the government's response to the
threat of terrorism. It thus deserves more public and academic
attention than it has received. 7 This Article examines the
regulatory model, with special attention paid to the ways this
model illuminates the problem of fear and mass panic
provoked by terrorist attacks. I will emphasize the difference
between using regulation to minimize risks that people fear,
and using regulation to reduce fear. Both are difficult, but the

1. See Occupational Health and Safety Admin., Anthrax in the Workplace: Risk
Reduction Matrix, available at http://www.osha.gov/bioterrorism/anthrax/
matrix/index.html (Nov. 26, 2001).
2. See Largest U.S. Trade Association for Pilots Reacts to White House Aviation
Security Plan, PR NEWSWIRE ASSOCIATION, Sept. 27, 2001.

3. See Thomas P. Vartanian, Sept. 11 Attacks Illustrated New Risks to Banking
System, AM. BANKER, Nov. 2,2001, at 17.
4. See Heather Dewar, When Chemical Safety Is a Matter of Security, BALT. SUN,
Oct. 17, 2001, at Al.
5. See Melody Petersen & Robert Pear, U.S. Acts to Increase Supply of Drugs to
CounterAnthrax, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2001, at Al.
6. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMBATING TERRORISM: SELECTED
CHALLENGES AND RELATED RECOMMENDATIONS, GAO-01-822 (2001).

7. Most academic work I have found takes for granted the military or law
enforcement models. See, e.g., Yonah Alexander, Terrorism in the Twenty-First
Century: Threats and Responses, 12 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 59 (1999/2000); IAN 0. LESSER
ET AL., COUNTERING THE NEW TERRORISM (1999).
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latter is more ambitious and offers the most hope for
undermining the use of terror to achieve political objectives.
I.

PRELIMINARIES: TERRORISM AND TERROR

[T]errorism [is] a distinctive mode of unconventional
psychological warfare aimed ultimately at bringing about a
climate8 of fear and collapse in an incumbent regime or target
group.
The regulatory model invites one to draw analogies between
terrorism and other sources of risk. Manufacturing processes
pose risks to workers; OHSA obliges employers to take health
and safety precautions. Factory pollution creates health risks
for nearby residents; EPA obliges factories to install scrubbers
or clean up spills. If these analogies hold, then agencies should
recognize that terrorism poses similar risks to the health and
safety of American citizens. Although the terrorists themselves
are often out of reach, agencies can require manufacturers,
trucking companies, railroads, hazardous material storage
facilities, airlines, and other businesses to take precautions that
minimize the risks to consumers, workers, bystanders, and
other individuals.
In some ways, these analogies are simple. OSHA's decision
whether to regulate the handling of mail is similar to its
decision whether to regulate the handling of hazardous
chemicals. If the risk of contracting anthrax or another disease
or injury from handling mail is high enough, and if employers
do not have sufficient incentives to protect their employees,
then OSHA might have reason to regulate mail rooms. The risk
posed by terrorist attack is not in relevant respects different
from the risk posed by dangerous machinery or pollution, and
the appropriate regulatory response is well understood.
In other ways, however, the analogies are more complex.
Although terrorist attacks can kill and injure thousands of
people and cause immense damage to property, the essence of
terrorism, as the name implies, is not destruction but terror.
Destruction is a means to the end, and the end is a
psychological effect. Terrorists use terrorism in order to
demoralize the citizens and public officials of the target nation

8. PAUL WILKINSON, TERRORISM AND THE LIBERAL STATE 114 (2d ed. 1986).
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and to promote their own political goals. Because the terrorists'
weapon is fear, the regulatory response to terrorism must make
fear the object of special concern.
The central role of fear in the regulatory response to terrorist
risks does not make the regulatory model false. Rather, it
directs attention to existing regulatory activities that take
special account of public fear. One thinks of the regulation of
nuclear power plants, toxic waste dumps, carcinogenic
pesticides, and air travel. Experience with the regulatory
response to fear provoked by these activities provides insights
that can be used in formulating a regulatory response to
terrorism.
The remaining Parts of this Article discuss three areas of
regulation that demand reappraisal in light of the threat of
terrorism: cost-benefit analysis, regulatory interventions, and
institutional reform.
II. EVALUATING REGULATIONS USING
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS

A.

The Nature of Fear

Fear is a complex psychological phenomenon, and it sits
uneasily with the rational actor premises of standard accounts
of risk regulation. One can, without fear, recognize a danger,
appraise the risk, and take steps to minimize the risk; this is a
purely cognitive response. But a person confronted by a danger
frequently has an involuntary emotional reaction. The fearful
person experiences a narrowing of attention toward the threat
and a disagreeable feeling that he can alleviate only by yielding
to the urge to flee.
Although the psychology of fear remains mysterious, some
things about fear are relatively well understood.9 First, a fearful
person typically misperceives, or acts as though he
misperceives, the magnitude of the risk. Fear interferes with
normal Bayesian updating: one can feel fear about, and react
disproportionately to, a threat that carries with it small
probability of harm. People also treat different but equally
9. For a discussion, with special attention to risk regulation and citations to the
psychology literature, see Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89 GEO. LJ. 1977,
2002-06 (2001).
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frightening risks as though they were the same.10
Second, a fearful person has, as observed above, a strong
desire to withdraw from the threat. One can think of this desire
more formally as a "hedonic cost" that people are willing to
pay to avoid. From a normative, cost-benefit perspective, the
existence of fear raises the question of whether the government
should devote resources to eliminating or reducing fear on the
ground that it constitutes a welfare loss. This possibility can be
contrasted with the normal practice of using regulation to
reduce risks to life, health, safety, and property, not to alleviate
directly unpleasant mental states.
Third, fear is contagious: one person can become fearful
upon observing that another person is fearful." We talk of bank
panics and food safety scares. Although it is rational to
withdraw your money from an uninsured bank if other
depositors are withdrawing their money, in a real bank panic
people are frightened and anxious; they stop thinking clearly.
Panics can have powerful psychological and physiological
consequences: people fall ill when other people fall ill as a
result of false beliefs about exposure to toxic agents. 2
Each of these elements of fear has special consequences for
the regulation of terrorist risks, and we discuss them in turn.
B. Fearas Risk Misperception

Cost-benefit analysis uses what I will call, though mindful of
the problems with this concept in probability theory,
"objective" probabilities of harm. By this, I mean only that an
agency calculates the benefit of a safety regulation using the
actual decrease in risk caused by the regulation, rather than the
public's perception of the decrease in risk. For example, if a
safety device reduces the probability of a fatal automobile
accident by one percent, but drivers believe that it reduces the
probability by five percent, the agency would use the one
percent figure.
10. See George F. Loewenstein, Elke U. Weber, Christopher K. Hsee & Neil
Welch, Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267 (2001). For a discussion of the
implications of "probability neglect" for law and public policy, see Cass R.
Sunstein, Probability Neglect Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law (2001)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
11. See Steven P. Schwartz, Paul E. White & Robert G. Hughes, Environmental
Threats, Communities andHysteria, 6 J. PUB. HEALTH POL'Y 58, 63-65 (1985).
12 See id.
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The
divergence between
subjective and objective
probabilities can cause trouble. If drivers do not learn the true
effect of the safety device, they will drive too much or with
insufficient care, possibly causing more fatalities than they
caused prior to the regulation. 3 In relying on objective
probabilities agencies assume that the latter closely enough
approximate subjective probability estimates, or else that
individuals will soon enough discover the truth as they acquire
experience or respond to further regulatory efforts to
disseminate information about objective risks. These
assumptions are probably justified in normal cases by the
difficulty of acquiring data about subjective probabilities and of
formulating a regulatory response tailored to individuals'
misperception of risks. But terrorist threats aggravate these
problems and could force regulators to confront them head on.
If the purpose of terrorism is to sow fear, then one of the main
effects of successful terrorism will be widespread
misperception about the dangerousness of airline travel, tall
buildings, public spaces, and the other targets of terrorist
attack. Terrorism, then, might call for a special regulatory
response, one that takes greater account of public fear than
ordinary regulation does. But what should this response be?
In principle, the response should resemble agencies'
responses to other risks about which the public is persistently
misinformed. Agencies often combat misinformation by
providing information to the public or by compelling firms to
provide information to the public. However, fear and
misinformation are not the same thing. Fearful people with the
correct information still act as though the probability of the
dreaded risk is higher than it is.
Another possibility is for agencies to overregulate relative to
objective risks. If people overestimate the risk of a terrorist
attack on a building, then agencies should require buildings to
install safety devices that would not be justified by a
conventional cost-benefit analysis. But because people who fear
a particular threat are insensitive to slight changes in the
underlying probability of the harm, they might not change

13. See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis
When PreferencesAre Distorted,29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105 (2000).
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C. Fearas Harm
In theory, cost-benefit analysis counts as a harm anything
that people are willing to pay to avoid. In practice agencies
restrict their focus to death, illness, injury, environmental
degradation, and property loss. They do not treat the fear of an
injury, or of a particularly bad kind of death or injury, as a
harm in itself.'5 Yet, as I have argued, the experience of fear is a
hedonic loss, and people are willing to pay money in order to
reduce their feelings of fear and anxiety. Agencies' neglect of
fear probably reflects the difficulty of acquiring reliable data
about people's emotional reactions. This response is pragmatic;
it has no theoretical basis in the normative underpinnings of
cost-benefit analysis.
Because terrorism generates fear, and is intended to do so, it
raises the question whether agencies should reconsider their
neglect of the costs of fear. If so, how?
Initially, we must distinguish the fear that accompanies the
harm itself and the fearful anticipation of the harm. A quick
death while asleep involves no emotional trauma; a slow
wasting illness does. For these reasons, one might want to treat
the latter as worse, that is, as more costly, justifying stricter
regulation of the harm-causing agent, than the first. 6 But I
want to focus on the anticipatory fear caused by terrorism.
After the attack on September 11, people feared traveling by
airplane and occupying tall buildings more than they did
before. The fear results in a hedonic loss and in costly
adjustments, such as travel by automobile. Should regulations
be designed to reduce this ex ante cost?
The answer depends, in part, on the sensitivity of fear to
regulatory efforts to alleviate it. Greater airline safety
regulation could reduce the risk of death and, at the same time,
people's anticipatory fear. If so, the benefit of the actual
reduction in fear should be added to the expected benefit of
lives saved. The two benefits are not necessarily related. Visible
but ineffectual regulations might reduce fear but not the risk of
14. For more discussion of these problems, see id.
15. See Cass R. Sunstein, BadDeaths,14 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 259 (1997).
16. See id.at 268-69.
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death, and invisible but effective regulations might reduce the
risk of death but not the fear. The two potential benefits of a
regulation, reduction of fear, reduction of injury and death,
must be kept distinct.
There is, however, a complication. Fear of a risk appears
often to diminish with time and continued exposure to the risk.
People do not fear death by automobile accident as much as
they fear less frequent kinds of deaths, apparently because they
have become psychologically accustomed to this risk. If people
can also become psychologically accustomed to small risks of
anthrax infection or deaths in other kinds of terrorist attacks,
then it might seem wrong to incorporate the fear into the costbenefit analysis. Costly, visible, intrusive regulation might be
justified in the short term by fear, but not in the long term in
light of people's capacity to adjust.
This is an attractive possibility, that over time terrorism will
stop causing fear, and is no more special than an industrial
accident. If so, it calls for no special regulatory response.
D. Fearand Contagion
I have observed that terrorists aim to spread fear, but they
are not so much interested in creating low-level anxiety as
creating mass panic and confusion. A recent editorial in a
medical journal points out that biological and chemical
weapons have limited destructive potential: "[T]he purpose of
these weapons is to wreak destruction via psychological means,
by inducing fear, confusion, and uncertainty in everyday life...
. It is customary to expect large scale panic if such weapons are
ever effectively deployed or thought to be deployed."' 7 The
authors provide examples of such panics in the wake of the
anthrax scare, where groups of people, primed by their anxiety
about anthrax, would fall ill after being exposed to a harmless
substance mistakenly thought to be a biological agent.'8 The
psychological literature contains many descriptions of similar
incidents in which numerous people fall ill after being exposed
as a group to a substance mistakenly thought to be

17. Simon Wessely, Kenneth Craig Hyams & Robert Bartholomew, Psychological
Implications of Chemical andBiological Weapons, 323 BRIT. MED. J. 878, 878 (2001).
18. See id.
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dangerous.' 9
Some authors argue that governments aggravate the risks of
panic by taking visible or unusual steps to combat the
underlying risks of harm. Individuals are more likely to panic
if they see government agents wearing protective suits, or
chemical weapons detectors in subway stations.2" More
generally, one might argue that the risk of panic should act as a
multiplier in any cost-benefit analysis: err on the side of
regulation because a limited harm, such as a single death from
anthrax, could provoke a large-scale panic in which people fall
ill, degrade antibiotics as a result of overuse, deplete stockpiles
of drugs, avoid public spaces, and refuse to open their mail.
The benefits side of a cost-benefit analysis should include
avoidance of mass panics as well as the material harms that
might provoke them.
All of these suggestions, however, founder on the ambiguity
of the phenomenon of panic. We do not know whether
chemical weapons detectors would make people more prone to
panic, because of false alarms, or less prone to panic, because of
the enhanced safety against a remote but terrifying risk. And
we have no way of choosing the proper multiplier, because we
do not know the probability that a relatively small harm will
provoke a mass panic.
Still, regulators' experiences with panics suggest some
common-sense precautions. Most important is a rapid response
to the terrorist attack and the dissemination of information
about the nature of the threat.
Ill. REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS FOR
COMBATING TERROR

So far, I have assumed that regulators must take fear as a
given and regulate against terrorism in a way that is sensitive
to people's fears about terrorist risks. The argument above
concluded that regulators might need to deviate from standard
cost-benefit practice and take account of the hedonic cost of
fear, the insensitivity of fear to objective probabilities, and the
danger of mass panic.
Now, I ask whether regulators can pursue a more direct
19. See, e.g., Schwartz, White & Hughes, supra note 11.
20. See Wesseley, Hyams & Bartholomew, supra note 17, at 878.
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course of action: regulate in a way that reduces fear rather than
respects it. If people stop fearing terrorist risks more than the
other risks of modern life, then terrorist risks become
susceptible to standard regulatory practices. The option of
reducing fear has many attractions, if it is possible: it reduces
the hedonic cost of fear, closes the gap between subjective and
objective probabilities, and decreases the risk of mass panic.
Ordinary cost-benefit practice, focusing on death, injury, and
property damage, and assuming knowledge of objective risks,
would apply to regulation of terrorist risk, as it already does
for many other risks. Most important, terrorism would lose
some of its value to terrorists.
Although recent terrorist attacks bring the problem of public
fear to the center of attention, the American government has
had to deal with public fear long before September 11. Franklin
Roosevelt's warning, "the only thing we have to fear is fear
itself,"2' was provoked by bank panics and the terrors of
poverty and disorder during the Great Depression. Growing
public awareness of cancer stoked people's fears about
environmental degradation and the safety of food. The AIDS
epidemic, reports of the Ebola virus, and mad cow disease all
caused minor panics. Many people fear everyday activities
such as driving, flying, and walking through an unfamiliar
neighborhood that has a high crime rate. During the Cold War,
people feared nuclear annihilation. And recently, although all
but forgotten, many feared that nuclear power plants, electrical
grids, airplanes, and the banking system would self-destruct on
midnight of December 31, 1999, all victims of the so-called
millennium bug.22 In these and many other cases, public
officials have had to struggle with public fear as well as the
underlying threat to health and safety. A brief survey of their
strategies will be helpful.

21. Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933), in AMERICAN
RHETORICAL DISCOURSE 720, 720 (Ronald F. Reid ed., 1998).
22. Year 2000 ComputerProblem: Did the World Overreact, and What Did We Learn?,
JointHearingBefore the Subcomm. on Gov't Mgmt., Info., and Tech. of the House Comm.
on Gov't Reform, and the Subcomm. on Tech. of the House Comm. on Sci.,
106th Cong.
(2001).
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Information

I observed that people gripped by fear misestimate risks, so
informing them of the magnitude of risks might have little
benefit, as long as they remain fearful. Yet fear itself sometimes
declines when authorities distribute information about the risks
involved. Fears about Y2K diminished as the public learned
that the functioning of airplanes, nuclear power plants, and
electrical grids does not depend on chronological clocks, or that
these systems can be fixed, and, further, that fixes can be easily
tested by turning the clocks ahead. Learning that a risk is small,
or smaller than everyday risks to which one is accustomed, can
calm a person.
But there are limits to the value of information. First,
authorities do not always have the relevant information, and
the disclosure that they do not have the information can cause
people to panic. The anthrax panic resulted, in part, from the
government's ignorance about the source of the anthrax letters
and its initial confusion about the technological grade of the
samples.
Second, authorities often have limited information that is
consistent with dangers that are greater than those already
feared by the public. If the government reveals this
information, panic might result; but if the government does not
reveal this information and it later comes out, the government's
credibility will decline. Government officials knew early on
that highly processed anthrax can be used to kill thousands of
people, but they chose not to stress this fact in order to avoid a
panic.
Third, the government can reveal information only if the
public trusts it.23 But how does the government maintain its
credibility?
B. MaintainingCredibility
There are two main ways of maintaining and enhancing
credibility. The first is signaling, through which the
government official subjects himself to a cost if his statements
turn out to be false. The head of the FAA alleviated concerns

23. See Paul Slovic, Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics, and Science: Surveying the Risk
Assessment Battlefield,1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 59.
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about aircraft safety during the Y2K scare by promising to
board a flight that would be in the air at midnight, December
31, 1999.24 People reasoned that if this official did not believe
her own statements, she would not take the flight.
The second way of maintaining or enhancing credibility is to
be repeatedly correct, and consistent. Certain agencies in the
U.S. government have excellent reputations for truthfulness,
including the National Transportation Safety Board and the
Centers for Disease Control. They established this reputation
by being right again and again, and by resisting political
pressures to stretch the truth. During the Y2K scare,
government officials gave consistent stories, and it was
important that their stories were also consistent with the views
of most independent experts.
Establishing credibility, however, is not always easy.
Signaling requires that the official know the truth, and also that
he has an opportunity to place his life or his political future on
the line. President Bush tried to send a signal by refusing, or
implying that he refused, to be tested for anthrax; but
unfortunately his statements were ambiguous, and in any
event nobody thought he was likely to have been exposed to
anthrax spores.
Being consistently right is also possible only if the official has
the relevant information and is highly competent. Political
leaders are not experts and are not always careful when they
speak, so they can end up contradicting themselves and each
other, as we have seen during the anthrax scare. Different
agencies have jurisdiction over an event, and because they have
different experts, different procedures, different standards of
proof, and are subject to varying political pressures, they do
not always make consistent statements. We have seen the CDC,
congressional leaders, the head of the Office of Homeland
Security, military officials, the FBI, and unnamed officials make
different statements about the potency of the anthrax spores
found in various locations. Because not everyone can be right,
everyone's credibility suffers.

24. Stephen Barr & Rajiv Chandrasekaran, A Dec. 31 Forecast: Mostly Empty
Skies; Few Want to Partyin the Air, WASH. POST, Nov. 17,1999, at Al.
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C. Reassurance
Officials reassure the public by telling it that there is little to
worry about if one takes precautions, and the government has
matters in control. Reassurance differs from information
disclosure by involving an evaluative component: these are the
facts, and they are not that bad. The power to reassure is subtle,
and there is little to say about it at an abstract level.
Unfortunately, the power to reassure cannot be
bureaucratized. Franklin Roosevelt had charisma, and was able
to reassure the American public during the Great Depression
and World War II. Mayor Giuliani has been reassuring because
he seems highly competent, very much informed about the
facts, candid, and emotionally involved. He has also put
himself in harm's way. For calming the public, leadership
counts more than regulation.
Reassurance can also conflict with information disclosure
and maintaining credibility. Officials early in the anthrax scare
sought to reassure the public with optimistic assessments of the
extent of the danger; when the anthrax attack turned out to be
more extensive and harder to control than first reported, the
public was disillusioned. The officials lost credibility and
sowed confusion about the nature of the threat. If the facts do
not offer grounds for reassurance, or the public understands
the threat as well as officials do, official reassurance might not
be possible.
D. Delay andAdjustment
People have become accustomed to the risk posed by
automobile and air travel, x-rays, various drugs, and vaccines.
A large literature on why people fear some risks more than
others shows that people fear new risks more than old risks.'
When people spend a lot of time exposed to a risk, they put it
out of their mind.
If there is a lag between the emergence of a new risk and
people's adjustment to it, then the best policy will sometimes
be to do nothing, and wait for people to adjust. This policy is
not exactly do-nothingism, for it involves a special political

25. See HOWARD MARGOLIS, DEALING WITH RISK: WHY THE PUBLIC AND THE

EXPERTS DISAGREE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (1997).
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skill, that of resisting calls for excessive or counterproductive
measures before adjustment has occurred.26 We do not want
officials to craft policy based on misperceptions caused by the
public's fear of a new risk; we would prefer officials to resist
political pressure and do nothing until the fear diminishes on
its own.
E. Coercion
Finally, government can respond to the misperceptions of a
fearful public by coercing it. I mean by this that government
can interfere with "irrational" responses to terrorist threat
when these responses have harmful external effects. Consider,
for example, panicked buying of Cipro and other antibiotics in
response to the anthrax threat. In one sense, the individuals
who buy Cipro are irrational because the risk that they are
infected with anthrax is more remote than risks against which
the same individuals do not take precautions. In another sense,
buying Cipro is a psychologically compelling mechanism for
coping with fear. But in either event, stockpiling Cipro poses a
threat to the public health if not enough is left for people who
are infected; also, if the purchasers ingest Cipro, its antibiotic
properties will degrade. A logical response is to more strictly
regulate the distribution of Cipro.
One problem with coercion is that it does not alleviate the
psychological harm of fear. As a result, people continue to
suffer an intrinsic harm, and their risk misperceptions might
find outlets in other areas, such as purchasing gas masks that
have no effect or refusing to open their mail. Another problem
with coercion is that it is politically unpopular. That is the topic
of Part IV.
F. An Example
Consider the proposal that the entire U.S. population be
vaccinated against smallpox. Experts are critical of the proposal
because (1) the risk that terrorists have obtained, or will obtain,
smallpox samples is very small; (2) the cost of developing an
adequate supply of a vaccine is very high; (3) the existing
vaccine, and especially diluted or newly developed versions,
26. See Clark McCauley, Terrorism, Research and Public Policy: An Overview, in
TERRORISM RESEARCH AND PUBLIC PoLIcY 126,137-39 (Clark McCauley ed., 1991).
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can have severe side effects; and (4) a smallpox outbreak, while
causing severe harm, could be contained through standard
public health measures like isolation and limited vaccination of
people in the affected area.' Further, one can add that (a) the
fear of smallpox might wane over time, and so people will stop
taking unnecessary precautions; (b) the fears of a vaccinated
population might be displaced to another threat, like nerve gas,
with no gain in psychological well-being; (c) more limited
forms of regulation, such as information disclosure or the
creation of safe rooms (as in Israel), might eliminate some
unnecessary or ineffective precautions.
But one must ask a further question, which is whether
limited forms of regulation falling short of universal
vaccination would calm public fears, thus making people
subjectively better off, less anxious, and less prone to taking
irrational
precautions.
Stubborn
anxiety-provoked
misperception about the current risks might cause people to
avoid public spaces, purchase gas masks, move to isolated
areas, and take other costly or ineffective precautions. In
addition, the hedonic cost of anxiety is a harm worth
eliminating if vaccination is not too costly and has the desired
psychological effect. Finally, even a limited outbreak of
smallpox could cause a mass panic, leading to paralysis of the
government and the economy. For better or worse, the U.S.
government is headed toward universal vaccination. 2
IV. BUREAUCRATIC REFORM?
A.

Government Vulnerability To Fear

Most experts argue that risk regulators should discount the
public's inaccurate views and issue scientifically responsible
regulations; risks should be evaluated by objective criteria and
not public fears. Although this position is more attractive than
the contrary view that the public's views are more correct than
scientists', it does overlook the problem of public resistance. In
implicitly assuming that officials have free rein to regulate, it

27. See Carol Vinzant, Scar Search; Amid Smallpox Fear, Many Seek Signs of

Childhood Shots, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2001, at Fl.
28. David Brown, U.S. Wants the Smallpox Virus Preservedfor FurtherResearch,
WASH. POST, Nov. 17,2001, at A9.
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overlooks that in a democracy the public is in the saddle. When
the public is terrified, elected officials gallop.
This problem is distinct from the concern that public officials
will, when afraid, make the same errors that the public does. If
this is true, then the game is up, though there might be
institutional mechanisms for ensuring that cooler heads have
authority during mass panics.
On the problem of government deference to public fear, or
even politicians' stirring up of public fears for political gain, the
record is not reassuring. Regulatory responses to nuclear
power, toxic waste dumps, pesticide use, and biotechnology
are often driven more by public fear than scientific
understanding.2 9
For similar reasons, a democratic government is particularly
vulnerable to fear spread by terrorism. If the public panics,
officials who do not panic must still, to some extent, implement
policy that the public wants. Yet there are grounds for hope. If
terrorism can be normalized, brought into line with the other
threats of modern life, and treated like these other objects of
government regulation, then people might not react to it
irrationally. One attraction of the regulatory model of
counterterrorism, compared to the military model and the law
enforcement model, is that it seeks to normalize the risk of
terrorism. If it succeeds, then it might make terrorism less
terrifying for citizens, and less valuable for terrorists.
B. InstitutionalReform: A Counterterrorism
Regulatory Agency?
Either a special government agency or existing agencies must
enact regulations to reduce the risk of terrorist attacks or the
resulting harm. Indeed, agencies are already doing this; some
examples were given in the introduction. But agencies must
also adjust. Because terrorists constantly change their strategies
in order to keep the public off guard, agencies must respond
more quickly than they are accustomed to, and this might
mean that procedural protections and judicial oversight should
be limited. In addition, because terrorists are more concerned
with sowing fear than causing harm, agencies must pay special
29. For several examples, see Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, Availability
Cascadesand Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 583, 691-703 (1999).
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attention to the psychology of fear.
Currently, jurisdiction over terrorist risks is divided among
many government agencies. The division of labor creates
worries about the ability of agencies to regulate terrorist risks.
The proper regulation of ventilation systems in office buildings
could depend on regulations of the use of vaccines and
antibiotics, and yet institutional rivalries or simply the cost of
coordination might prevent OSHA, FDA, and CDC from
effective cooperation. There is nothing new about the
interdependence of the agencies and the overlap of
jurisdictions, but the terrorist threat, because terrorists are
always searching for new vulnerabilities, heightens concerns
about bureaucratic efficiency.
At the same time, a new "counterterrorism agency" vested
with authority over all activities that are susceptible to terrorist
risks would require radical changes in the current
administrative structure, with dubious returns. Conflicts would
not be eliminated but displaced. OSHA regulates ventilation in
work-places already; if a new agency started regulating
ventilation in workplaces likely to be subject to terrorist attacks,
and not others, OSHA's job would be enormously complicated.
At this early stage in the war on terrorism, then, it might
make sense to create a centralized agency that has the power to
intervene in the rulemaking of other agencies, to fund research,
to coordinate regulatory activities, to sift intelligence, and to
publicize the government's counterterrorist activities. The
bureaucracy had been inching toward this solution even before
the September 11 attack. The attack finally produced the Office
of Homeland Security, the "focal point" or administrative
center long recommended by GAO.3" But many difficult
questions remain. The Office currently has little formal power.
Should it have the authority to direct agencies to issue needed
regulations? Should terror-related regulations be subject to less
judicial review, given their time sensitive nature? Should they
be shielded from information disclosure rules? Here we see, as
we have seen in the law enforcement context, the possibility
that traditions of open government might need to yield to the
exigencies of security. These questions, and many others, will
need to be worked out as experience accumulates.
30. See U.S. GEN. AcCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 6.
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